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A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology 
Arthur Cockfield∗ and Jason Pridmore∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article outlines a synthetic theory of law and 
technology that could contribute to the development of legal 
analysis at the intersection of law and technology.  The theory 
is ‘synthetic’ as it is based upon a synthesis of instrumental and 
substantive theories of technology. Generally speaking, 
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instrumental theories tend to treat technology as a neutral tool 
without examining its broader social, cultural, and political 
impacts.  In contrast, substantive theories emphasize the ways 
in which technological systems can exert ‘control’ over 
individuals, often without their knowledge.  A synthesis is 
necessary because each theory, standing alone, has 
disadvantages that reduce its potential for interfacing with 
legal analysis.  Instrumental theories fail to recognize the 
contextual complexities that should and must inform all legal 
analyses. This failure is profound when that analysis is 
employed in the search for optimal policy solutions in an 
environment of changing technology.  Substantive theories, on 
the other hand, appear to over-emphasize the need to address 
the social impact of technological structures while downplaying 
the relevance of human agency. They also tend towards 
abstraction and they undervalue the need to examine  each 
case on its particular facts and circumstances. 
Yet both theories and their accompanying bodies of 
literature have much to offer legal analysis in situations where 
technological changes appears to threaten legally protected 
values and interests.  Together, the two visions can be 
combined into a synthetic theory that presents a new view of 
the relationship between law and technology: in times of 
technological change, (when interests traditionally protected by 
law are threatened), legal analysis should become more 
contextual and forward-looking and less deferential to 
traditional doctrine.  In doing so, legal analysis focusing on the 
future paradoxically ensures that traditionally-protected 
interests remain protected.1  This view in turn can be broken 
down into a two-part legal analytical framework: 
1.  Applying traditional doctrine, consider whether 
technology change threatens traditional interests that 
the law seeks to protect; and 
2.  After determining that the legal interests are 
threatened by changes in technology, legal analysis 
should adopt a more contextual approach that is less 
deferential to traditional doctrinal approaches.2 
 1. This perspective on the relationship between law and technology was 
discussed in an earlier article. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Towards a Law and 
Technology Theory, 30 MAN. L. J. 383 (2004).  This paper draws to a certain 
extent from this earlier work. 
 2. This approach is more closely related to substantive theories of 
technology that explore potential unanticipated adverse outcomes associated 
with technological change. 
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of the literature 
associated with instrumental and substantive theories of 
technology.  The instrumentalists are often identified with 
strains of thought that respect human agency in matters of 
technology, in part because technology itself is sometimes 
perceived to be neutral in its impact on human affairs and in 
part because of their emphasis upon human powers.  Part I also 
reviews some of the important works that discuss substantive 
theories of technology with an emphasis on sociological works. 
In contrast to the instrumental perspective, the substantive 
theories emphasize how technological structure can overcome 
human agency.  Moreover, substanstive theories sometimes 
seek to show that technological change has been discontinuous 
in the sense that modern technologies increasingly exert more 
‘control’ over our lives.  Finally, Part I includes a discussion of 
recent works, including critical theories, which challenge or 
elaborate on aspects of the substantive theories or try to 
reconcile them with instrumental perspectives. 
Part II begins by briefly explaining the current legal 
approach in which technology law is compartmentalized into 
discrete areas of enquiry such as copyright law, in contrast to 
other academic disciplines that have developed mature theories 
of technology.  The Part then focuses on a discussion of how 
instrumental and substantive theories could help to generate a 
general theory of law and technology and their interaction.  
From the standpoint of legal analysis, instrumental and 
substantive theories have both strengths and weaknesses.  A 
combination of the two main theoretical strands might well 
contribute to the development of an improved analytical 
framework for indentifying and implementing optimal social 
policy.  In particular, legal analysis that is informed by 
substantive theoretical perspectives could provide better 
critiques of the ways that technology developments affect 
and/or potentially subvert interests now protected and 
promoted by law.  Part II also elaborates on the proposed 
synthetic theory of law and technology and illustrates how this 
theory would inform law and technology analysis by examining 
new surveillance technologies and post-September 11th legal 
changes involving state searches and privacy interests. 
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I. THE INSTRUMENTAL THEORIES 
A. OVERVIEW: ASSESSING THE WORKS IN TERMS OF 
STRUCTURE/AGENCY AND TRANSFORMATION/CONTINUATION 
Numerous ways exist for engaging in a sociological 
analysis of technology. Some of these are rooted in the earliest 
traditions of sociological analysis (such as those associated with 
Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and George Simmel. 
Others have begun to reorient the field of study beyond these 
modes of enquiry and toward approaches less reliant upon their 
sociological forbearers.3 
In essence, we suggest that sociological approaches to 
technology can be understood broadly as differing on two major 
analytical dimensions.4 First, sociological approaches tend to 
emphasize either the potential of human agency in addressing 
the implications of technological development or the structural 
dominance of technological systems and logic. In many cases, 
the latter is tied to economic foundations, such as capitalism.  
For others, the technology is either the logic of the structure5 or 
a reflection of a newly formed structure.6  However, while these 
approaches have an overarching emphasis on either agency or 
structure, most approaches note how agency affects structure 
and vice versa. 
A second dichotomous distinction embodied in sociological 
approaches to technology is the emphasis either on the 
continuation or the transformation of society as a result of new 
technology. The fundamental concern raised is whether the 
development of new technologies constitutes a clearly 
distinctive time in which the past, and its conceptions and 
experiences, has been rendered obsolete, or whether there is 
simply a continuation of old forms that have been differently 
cloaked. This discussion has largely been articulated in terms 
of modernity and what is referred to as “late” or “post” 
 3. The following literature review does not purport to offer a 
comprehensive examination: for instance, we do not review sociological 
approaches that rely on Social Systems theory or that of Critical Realism. 
 4. See, e.g., Samuel E. Trosow, The Ownership and Commodification of 
Legal Knowledge: Using Social Theory of the Information Age as a Tool for 
Policy Analysis, 30 MAN. L. J. 417 (2004) (comparing different theoretical 
perspectives along seven strands). 
 5. See infra  Part I.C.3. 
 6. See infra Part I.C.4. 
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modernity.  However, regardless of this split, these approaches 
to technology have been equally critical and hopeful about the 
prospects of technology and its implications.7 
We will attempt to parse these approaches in terms of their 
positions on the structure/agency and 
transformation/continuation dialectics, but we acknowledge 
that these are reductionist interpretations of complex theories.  
As such, we recognize that these divisions are, to a certain 
extent, artificially concocted dichotomies.  Instrumentalism is a 
social perspective which is only loosely articulated as a 
theoretical approach.  The instrumental perspective can be tied 
to an articulation of optimistic conceptions of a knowledge and 
information society that has taken full advantage of the 
technological tools at its disposal. 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIMISM 
A number of theorists, particularly in communications and 
economics, hold that technology is simply a tool – an 
instrument of the social, political, or economic group or 
individual that chooses to develop and use a certain 
 7. Anthony Giddens, for instance suggests that forms of modernity have 
simply become “radicalized,” and indicates this as “late” modernity. The 
implications for Giddens of this in relation to technology is one of ambivalence, 
whereby the intensification of modernity has rendered technology 
simultaneously something we can control and something that is capable of 
becoming uncontrollable at any moment. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY  (1990). What the notion of postmodernity 
attempts to do is unlink social change from notions of progress. This shift 
away from notions of progress is a theoretical move that situates things like 
technology as part of a language game, better understood as a form of 
discourse. One of the major points of postmodernism is Mark Poster’s idea that 
we have moved into a “mode of information,” something that has transformed 
our social world.  See MARK POSTER, THE MODE OF INFORMATION: 
POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND SOCIAL CONTEXT (1990). We increasingly 
experience the world in terms of images, and see computer generated data (let 
alone images) as real as other forms of corporeal information. This is precisely 
what Jean Baudrillard suggests as well. Baudrillard’s notion of the 
“hyperreal” suggests that the reality we hold to be true is broken down into 
images alone and that these images are detached from their actual “referent” 
– the “real” world object we may have thought they were indicating.  See JEAN 
BAUDRILLARD: SLECTED WRITINGS 171-172 (Mark Poster ed., 1988). What 
Baudrillard expresses is a world in which nothing is seen as genuine or 
authentic, a world in which that which is a representation is treated as being 
“more real” than the “real.” Technology in this context is just a self-referential 
trope, akin to the dreamworld depicted in movies like The Matrix, which 
contains a number of references to Baudrillard’s works.  See THE MATRIX 
(Warner Bros. 1999). 
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technology.8 This instrumental perspective is, as Andrew 
Feenberg suggests, the most widely accepted view of 
technology.9 It is entrenched in many social sciences and 
bureaucratic organizations, from business to government to 
non-profit organizations, and pervades everyday parlance 
regarding technology in the larger society. This perspective on 
technology holds that technology is completely neutral, solely 
serving the intended purposes held for it by its users.10 
The use of certain forms of technology may preclude the 
use of other technologies, but these “trade-offs” are calculable 
choices rationally arrived at through different forms of debate.  
However, authors who espouse this perspective, albeit rarely 
explicitly, clearly prefer public and democratic debate.11 This 
instrumental perspective holds that technology exists as a form 
of truth that can be readily transferred across societies. It is 
efficient and rational, and its productivity can be measured 
objectively, regardless of culture. It is a bit of an 
understatement to say that this technological perspective is shy 
of being a critical perspective on the future potential for and of 
technology, or even of its current effects. This is quite obvious 
in comparing this perspective with the substantive theories on 
technology we will discuss in the pages below. 
Yet, this understanding of technology strongly emphasizes 
the abilities of human agency over and against the potential 
limitations of technological systems (i.e., structures). For the 
instrumentalists, human beings can and do direct the use of 
technology, and the fears of technological tyranny overcoming 
human autonomy are unfounded. Some instrumental 
approaches, however, such as those found in the management 
sciences,12 ignore questions of individual autonomy because 
they are exclusively focused on enhancing efficiency, leaving 
the social questions to other disciplines. 
This instrumental view can be seen as a backdrop to many 
of the perspectives that articulate the arrival of a new 
information society. One of most well-known of these 
perspectives is Alvin Toffler’s The Third Wave, in which he 
 8. See, e.g., ANDREW FEENBERG, TRANSFORMING TECHNOLOGY: A 
CRITICAL THEORY REVISITED 5-6 (2002). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 252 (1995). 
 12. See, e.g., Rias J. van Wyk, Technology: A Fundamental Structure?, 15 
KNOWLEDGE, TECH. & POL’Y 14, 19-31 (2002). 
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articulates three “waves” of technological innovation: 
agricultural, industrial, and informational.13 The latter of 
these, in whose throes we presumably remain today, has 
transformed our world into one oriented toward and almost 
completely dependent upon computer communication 
technologies. Toffler’s perspective on the potential for new 
information and communication technologies is probably best 
expressed in a more recent context in an article he co-authored 
entitled “Cyberspace and the American Dream.”14  The authors 
of this article advocate a transformation of the legal and 
political barriers to what could be viewed as their “utopian” 
perspective on cyberspace. They call for the removal of 
obstacles to free market competition in the information 
technology and communications sectors, and they call upon 
governments to resist the temptation to control  growth of 
online multimedia platforms.15 
This article articulates an approach to technology that is 
exemplified in a number of other fairly optimistic and 
instrumental discussions of new technologies. For example, 
Charles Leadbeater has similarly advocated for a redesign of 
economic systems to make better use of knowledge capitalism – 
something he sees as consisting of “innovation, design, 
branding, [and] know-how.”16 He suggests that the potential for 
developing, using and spreading knowledge should be on the 
forefront of economic agendas, in recognition of social capital as 
a driving factor in the global economy.17  Before these texts, but 
after Toffler’s earliest declaration of a third wave economy, 
Yoneji Masuda clearly articulated a marked social 
transformation in the shift from an industrial society to an 
information society based on his particularly Japanese 
perspective.18 He suggested that society has undergone and 
continues to undergo a variety of substantial transformations; 
the end result of which will not be an updated industrial age 
 13. See ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 26 (1980). 
 14. See Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth & Alvin Toffler, 
Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age, 
12 INFO. SOC’Y 295 (1996). 
 15. Id. 
 16. CHARLES LEADBEATER, THE WEIGHTLESS SOCIETY: LIVING IN THE 
NEW ECONOMY BUBBLE 22-24 (2000). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See YONEJI MASUDA, MANAGING IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 3-10 
(2d ed. 1990). 
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but a new and unique period in human existence.19 
Other instrumentalist perspectives outline a prediction of 
the future based on the potentials for and use of new 
technology. However, they rarely problematize the technologies 
themselves. For instance, in the case of Donald Norman’s The 
Invisible Computer, social issues are relegated to user error or, 
more importantly, as he articulates in this text, poor design.20 
There may not be a more clear instrumental and optimistic 
perspective on the future than Bill Gates’ The Road Ahead, 
which focuses on the potentials and future of the new 
information technologies. Even Gates, however, is aware that 
“As with all major changes, the benefits of the information 
society will carry costs.”21 
In essence, instrumentalist perspectives are often 
optimistic about technology. This optimism is shared to 
differing extents by sociological theorists like Manuel Castells, 
but his is a cautious optimism. The social theories concerned 
with technology discussed next (perhaps because many are 
revisions of Marxist approaches) tend to be a bit more 
pessimistic about potentials for technology.22 
 19. See id. 
 20. See DONALD A. NORMAN, THE INVISIBLE COMPUTER: WHY GOOD 
PRODUCTS CAN FAIL, THE PERSONAL COMPUTER IS SO COMPLEX, AND 
INFORMATION APPLIANCES ARE THE SOLUTION (1998). 
 21. GATES, supra note 11, at 251.  
 22. It is important, however, to note the very early contribution of another 
Marxist theorist, Daniel Bell.  The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society is one 
of the earliest key texts on the information society, heralding the coming age 
in which computers and information would be everywhere.  See DANIEL BELL, 
THE COMING OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL 
FORECASTING (1973). Bell highlighted a world in which people would engage 
in “knowledge work” and in which capitalism would be radically altered. While 
his Marxist perspective is clear in his focus on the transformation of labor and 
capital in the “post-industrial society,” the more melancholy Marxist notions of 
alienation and oppression are tempered by Bell’s optimism for this radically 
altered “new” society.  In fact, one of the main distinctions between Bell’s 
perspectives on technology and society from a Marxist perspective is his 
emphasis on the transformation of capitalist objectives, instead of a 
continuation. While he acknowledges the rise of technical elites and suggests 
that the shift from manufacture to service industries will be problematic, his 
overall optimism has more in common with those who can be deemed as 
instrumentalists than those who have taken up traditional Marxist positions. 
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C. SUBSTANTIVE THEORIES 
1. Overview: The Substantive Impact of Technology on Society 
Sociology and other disciplines often place an emphasis on 
substantive or critical theories that offer interpretations of 
technology that have arisen from and share a heritage with the 
writings of Karl Marx, specifically their embodiment in critical 
theory and political economy. We begin our discussion of 
substantive theories by reviewing a few key works in this area.  
The Article will then turn to the famed sociologist of law, Max 
Weber, and his view that bureaucracy and technology form an 
iron cage, followed by a review of Jacques Ellul’s emphasis on 
“technique.”  We then briefly examine how recent writings 
strive to confront the issue of technological determinism, 
including Manuel Castells’ notion of a network society, science 
and technology studies and approaches that emphasize social 
biases in technology. 
Before we begin the review, it may be helpful to offer an 
example of how technologies can have a political, social, 
cultural, or other substantive impact on society so that, 
according to the substantive theories, the technologies are not 
merely neutral tools.  In Do Artifacts Have Politics?, Langdon 
Winner simply accepts the premise that technologies are 
interwoven into modern politics and in fact embody specific 
forms of power and authority.23  To sustain this point, Winner 
presents two examples.24  In the first example, highway 
overpass bridges were deliberately built low to prevent low-
income transportation, like buses, from travelling out of New 
York City toward the homes of the wealthy on Long Island.25  
In the second example, although mechanical iron molding 
machines did not work as well, or as cheaply as skilled iron 
workers, they were implemented to effectively prevent iron 
workers from unionizing. This provided the steel mill owners 
with an alternative, if needed.26  To Winner, it is obvious that 
technologies stack the deck in favor of certain social and 
political interests and, as such, the technologies have a 
substantive impact on society that exists outside of their 
 23. See Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 
122 (Winter 1980). 
 24. Id. at 123-124. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 124-125. 
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intended uses.27 
2. Marxist Approaches to Technology 
Perhaps as a result of the dominance of Karl Marx’s 
conceptions and critiques of capitalism within many sociology 
departments, most sociological perspectives on technology have 
been, at a minimum, influenced by Marx’s ideas. Indeed, some 
sociologists see themselves as the contemporary torchbearers of 
his thought. The perspectives of critical theory and political 
economy (sociological) perspectives on technology are certainly 
two modes of analysis that share a Marxist heritage. Political 
economists within sociology and communication studies, 
however, generally are seen by themselves and others within a 
framework of critical theory. The difference is in their foci.  
Critical theory is a much broader theoretical means of 
critiquing society as a whole while political economists focus 
their work on critically assessing the means of production and 
distribution of technology. 
Critical theory arose out of the Frankfurt Institute for 
Social Research founded in 1923 in Frankfurt, Germany. Two 
of its members, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, offer 
provocative critiques of culture in their book Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.28 Throughout this text, Horkheimer and 
Adorno argued that the Enlightenment, rather than liberating 
people from fear, has produced new forms of authority and 
control.29  This barbarism is quite clearly wrapped up in forms 
of instrumental rationality and administration that reinforces 
the demands of capitalism and is a base from which all forms of 
new technology are born.30  They reserve some of their sharpest 
and most poignant criticism for the culture industry, which 
they suggest partakes willingly in the repression of human 
freedom and autonomy through mass deception.31 The 
underlying emphasis in this text is that technologies, and in 
 27. See generally id.  Winner’s approach to technology is largely seen as 
most closely associated with those of science and technology studies discussed 
below, but the notion that there are interrelations between the social and 
political production of technology pervades all of the substantive theories of 
technology we discuss. 
 28. See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF 
ENLIGHTENMENT  (John Cumming trans., 2d ed. 1995). 
 29. Id. at xi. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
COCKFIELD A & PRIDMORE J. A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 2007;8(2):475-513. 
2007] A SYNTHETIC THEORY OF LAW & TECH. 485 
                                                          
particular new media of technology, are designed not to 
encourage human liberation and freedom, but rather to set 
limiting parameters in which human beings can express 
themselves. The “freedom to choose an ideology. . .everywhere 
proves to be freedom to choose what is always the same,”32  and 
technology is simply another means by which to perpetuate 
capitalist forms of oppression and domination. 
Fellow Frankfurt School critical theorist Herbert Marcuse 
is even more explicit about the role of technology in his work 
One Dimensional Man.33  In the text, Marcuse holds as a thesis 
the notion that society has been collapsed into one dimension of 
thought or action—a technical and rational dimension. 
Marcuse holds that technology cannot be distinguished from 
how it is put to use. In the present course of events, technology 
has imposed itself as a system of domination, removing 
possibilities for any other alternatives in discourse, action, or 
thought.34 Social validity is dependent on the “technologically 
rational.” “Technology,” according to Marcuse, “serves to 
institute new, more effective, and more pleasant forms of social 
control and social cohesion.”35 Through this process, notions of 
personal autonomy and freedom are being replaced by 
suggested needs and desires generated by an increasingly 
“rational” society. 
One of the more recent critical texts is Andrew Feenberg’s 
Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited.36  This 
text is an update on a 1991 work entitled A Critical Theory of 
Technology. Unlike Frankfurt School theorists like 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, who explicitly and implicitly 
posit the predominance of structural control, Feenberg 
attempts to reinstate a notion of human agency and engage in 
“politics of technological transformation.”37 Feenberg believes 
that critical theorists’ acquiescence to the inevitable 
technological structure in the 1970’s was a wrong turn, and 
that critical theory needs to engage in a more interventionist 
strategy.38 
In Feenberg’s view, though capitalism has provided an 
 32. Id. at 166-7. 
 33. See HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE 
IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964). 
 34. Id. at 18. 
 35. Id. at xv. 
 36. See FEENBERG, supra note 8. 
 37. Id. at 13. 
 38. Id. at 18 
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incredibly efficient means of distribution and production, it is 
unsustainable.39 Critical theory, he suggests, must engage 
capitalism and the implications it has for technological 
development and technical and rational thinking. Feenberg 
argues that a current critical theory must be one that focuses 
on human relations to matter, rather than one that is 
concerned with perpetuating our technological dominance over 
it or, as was the case with earlier forms of critical theory, 
simply critiquing this dominance.40 
While Feenberg seeks to revitalize critical theory, Herbert 
Schiller and other political economists focus on the production 
and distribution of new information and communication 
technologies.41  Schiller does not see the information society as 
any sort of new configuration of the social world.  He sees the 
information society in terms of an economic continuation of the 
past. Capitalism, though perhaps refined and modified slightly, 
remains, and it remains with a fairly strong division between 
“haves” and “have nots.”42 
Both critical theory and political economy on the whole 
emphasize the dominance of social structure over and against 
the power of human agency. Yet authors generally recognized 
as critical theorists and political economists do give significant 
caveats to the powers of human intervention and agency. On 
the one hand, political economists tend to hold a fair bit of hope 
out for the prospects of unions and government regulation. The 
critical theorists, on the other, see the potential for change in 
the engagement of social dialogue and critique, though 
Feenberg and other later authors may hold more hope for this 
than the radically pessimistic opinions of earlier Frankfurt 
School critical theorists.43  What is apparent in these texts is 
an emphasis on the structures embodied in technology and 
technological practices and their precedence over and against 
the constrained agency of human or even institutional action. 
Further, critical theorists and especially political economists 
make clear that technology embodies a continuation of old 
 39. Id. at 24-27. 
 40. Id. at 170. 
 41. See FRANK WEBSTER, THEORIES OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 124-
160 (2002). 
 42. See Herbert I. Schiller, Striving for Communication Dominance: A 
Half-Century review, in ELECTRONIC EMPIRES 17, 19–20 (Daya Kishan Thussu 
ed., 1998). 
 43. See supra  nn.23-34 and accompanying text. 
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forms of capitalist logic and practice, one that limits the 
potential to conceptualize new forms of technology with a new 
formation of society. 
The predominance of technological structure as a 
continuation of previous modes of social and political practice 
that overwhelms individual will in a dehumanizing way is also 
apparent in the works of Max Weber and Jacques Ellul, to 
whom we now turn. 
3. Weber’s “Iron Cage” and Jacques Ellul’s Technique 
In the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,44 Max 
Weber suggests that Puritan ethics and ideas influenced the 
development of capitalism.45  Weber describes capitalism as 
creating an organizational shift towards 
rationalization/bureaucratization from a value-oriented 
organization to a goal-oriented organization.  As a result, the 
increased rationalization of human life traps individuals in an 
“iron cage” of rule-based, rational control: the new economic 
order “is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of 
machine production which to-day determine the lives of all 
individuals who are born into this mechanism . . . with 
irresistible force.”46 
Though Weber’s notion of the iron cage—the restrictive 
rationalization of human life that society has created for 
itself—has filtered throughout many contemporary texts, it is 
perhaps best rearticulated in light of the theoretical position of 
Jacques Ellul. Ellul, yet another transformed Marxist, suggests 
in his first major text, The Technological Society, that current 
society and society’s future will be one in which people become 
 44. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPRIT OF CAPITALISM 
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958). 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. at 181.  Weber rejects the metaphor of capitalism as a “light cloak” 
that can be thrown aside in favor of the metaphor of an “iron cage.”  Id.  For 
an effort to link Weber’s views more directly with technology concerns, see 
Terry Maley, Max Weber and the Iron Cage of Technology, 24 BULL. OF SCI., 
TECH. & SOC’Y 69 (2004) (claiming that Weber should be reassessed as a 
compelling critic of science and technology). Importantly, Maley suggests that 
there is a potential for human agency found within Weber’s work and that one 
need not take the same direction as Ellul. See id. at 74.  Rather Weber “does 
not foreclose the possibility of meaningful intervention” in his postulation of 
the iron cage.  Id. at 84.  See also LAWRENCE A. SCAFF, FLEEING THE IRON 
CAGE: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND MODERNITY IN THE THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER 
(1989). 
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increasingly dependent on machines.47 This is a society in 
which people order their lives to accommodate the demand of 
rationality and efficiency, the mode of operation upon which 
machines exist. In his numerous texts, Ellul questions whether 
such a society has indeed progressed. Rather, he contends that 
the advent of the technological environment has seriously 
impinged upon human freedom and autonomy.48  In his 
writing, the social, political, and economic worlds are seen in 
terms of epochal transitions, and Ellul was concerned about 
what he saw as a particularly dire transition to an oppressive 
epoch, that of the technological society.49 
Jacques Ellul focused on a notion of dialectics inspired by 
Hegel and Marx, yet he believed that the dialectical tensions of 
our social world were not ones that would ever come to some 
final solution or synthesized resolution.50  Dialectics, he 
believed, go much further than the class struggles suggested by 
Marx; instead, they pervade every aspect of our lives.51 For 
Ellul, this is what arguably makes us human; our living out the 
tensions of life proves us to be free, to be cognitive creatures 
that have a full sense of agency and autonomy. 
This tension is the central element of Ellul’s work, and he 
suggests that the technological society has begun to make the 
tensions that make us human, in many respects, collapse in 
favor of those in line with technical considerations. In this 
technological society, all of life is being subsumed by 
 47. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson 
trans., 1964). 
 48. Id. at 138. 
 49. See JACQUES ELLUL, WHAT I BELIEVE 135 (Geoffrey W. Bromily trans., 
1985). 
 50. Id. at 29-46. 
 51. ELLUL, supra note 50. Ellul believed that at every moment we are torn 
between things like life and death; torn between the ability to make a change 
in our world and recognize our own insignificance. We struggle between 
rational decisions and emotional ones, and for Ellul, life is always dialectic in 
this perspective. Resolution of these tensions, unlike the synthesis that 
Marxism provides, was not found in a new synthesis between these two binary 
oppositions. We cannot create a “middle ground,” so to speak, in any of the 
tensions we face (like a proletariat revolution and the institution of a 
communist state). Instead, Ellul suggested that synthesis (insofar as it is a 
synthesis) occurs only by simultaneously living out the tension between the 
two. We embody life and death at the same time. We live the struggle of being 
rational and being irrational (emotional). See Wha-Chul Son, Reading Jacques 
Ellul’s The Technological Bluff in Context, 24 BULL. OF SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 
518 (2004). 
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“technique” described as “the totality of methods rationally 
arrived at and having absolute efficiency . . . in every field of 
human activity.”52  The essence of this fairly dense definition 
suggests that everything is measured against its rationality 
and efficiency.  As subsequently discussed in Part II.B., the 
tension identified by Ellul is also a helpful way to understand 
the tension inherent within the law that simultaneously looks 
backwards (to promote consistency and certainty) and tries to 
move forward (to account for changing facts and 
circumstances). 
4. Technological Determinism and Recent Efforts 
One of the underlying concerns in most substantive 
theories of technology is the notion of technological 
determinism. These theories frame technology, to greater or 
lesser extents, as inherently possessing a structure that in turn 
produces a society that must act and exist in certain ways. 
Modern technologies, as suggested by Ellul and others, are the 
real culprits in enhancing this determinism.53  Consider Martin 
Heidegger’s views set out in Question Concerning Technology.54  
According to Heidegger, modern technology uses resources from 
nature and the world, and converts them into energy to achieve 
its objectives.  While ancient technologies were at the whim of 
nature, modern technology reverses this role, and makes itself 
master over nature. 
Heidegger illustrates his point by comparing a sawmill in 
the Black Forest to a dam on the Rhine. The sawmill uses the 
energy of the river, but only turns as the river flows, faster as 
the river rises and slower as the current drops off.  The hydro 
dam, on the other hand, has blocked the Rhine, forcing its 
water to flow through it at a uniform rate.  It essentially turned 
the Rhine into a standing reserve for artificial purposes.  
Heidegger sees this as symptomatic of modern technology, 
which treats nature as a standing reserve forced to provide us 
with endless and efficient resources.  But humans 
inadvertently also become a part of this process, whereby we 
 52. ELLUL, supra note 47, at xxv. 
 53. See Thomas P. Hughes, Technological Momentum, in DOES 
TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY? 101, 112 (Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx eds., 
1994) ( “A technological system can be both a cause and an effect; it can shape 
or be shaped by society. As they grow larger and more complex, systems tend 
to be more shaping of society and less shaped by it.”). 
 54. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY 
AND OTHER ESSAYS (1977). 
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are forced to keep up with and adapt to technology.  This leads 
to Heidegger’s two problems with technology: first, we humans 
are treated as mere resources, and second, while we think we 
are the masters, we are not. We cannot see this, or understand 
the world around us because modern technology obscures our 
vision.  Once we can identify these two problems, we can 
understand the ‘essence’ of technology.55 
Alternatively, an instrumental perspective towards 
technology would hold the opposite view: that technology is 
only a tool and has no inherent structure. Most sociological 
schools have rejected this latter idea as fundamentally naïve, 
but many are also wary of attributing too much power to 
technology, something plainly evident in Ellul’s texts.  The 
texts discussed next tend to point to the complexity of 
conceptualizing technology, attempting neither to hold 
deterministic assumptions nor neglect technology’s inherently 
social character. Each of these texts begins by arguing that 
technology is never created or used in a social vacuum; rather it 
is always part and parcel of social pretenses and purposes. 
More recent works have tried to address the issue of 
technological determinism by trying to assess its complexities 
in a more comprehensive manner.  For Manuel Castells, the 
transformation towards information capitalism is one in which 
the social, economic, and political worlds have become 
centralized around networks that link people, institutions, and 
countries.56  This is “the network society” we now dwell within, 
and it is largely a result of the development of information and 
communication technologies such as the Internet and mobile 
phones that enable communication and the transmission of 
information and ideas to occur on an unprecedented global 
scale.57  By shifting the focus in social analysis towards that of 
a network, Castells has articulated a new way of 
understanding the connection between humanity and 
technology. Castells’ work places people and their artifacts in a 
mutually bound relationship. 
To some extent, Castells’ work avoids the issue of 
“essentializing” technology by instead “essentializing” the 
 55. Id. at 5.  This is also the explicit concern of Jacques Ellul and the 
effects of “technique,” that humans have turned into mere resources.  See 
JACQUES ELLUL, WHAT I BELIEVE 137 (Geoffrey W. Bromiley trans., 1989). 
 56. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (1996). 
 57. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY 2 (2001). 
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network in which technology is intrinsically bound.58  While 
this circumvents the pitfalls and perils of both critical and 
instrumental views of technology, Castells does not give us a 
sense of how best to understand technological artifacts 
themselves. Perhaps this is because it is impossible to do so: 
one can not remove a technology or a conception of technology 
from the networks of relations in which it is bound, nor can one 
extract the relationships of human beings with technology from 
the network in which they are bound. Both technology and 
humanity are necessarily implicated in and bound together 
within complex social relationships. 
Rather than focus on networks as a unit of analysis like 
Castells, Science and Technology Studies (STS) focuses on 
understanding “science and technology as social relations and 
as socially constructed.”59 That is, while Castells gives us a 
sense of how important the networks are to technology (and 
vice versa), STS gives us a sense of the complexity of social 
structures behind the production, distribution and consumption 
of science and technology.  According to STS, we can learn more 
about technology by paying attention to the processes by which 
technologies are made and the myriad of ways in which these 
technologies may be put to use, which vary in degree from the 
intentions or original design.60 This suggests that science and 
technology developments are driven by social relationships and 
networks as well as formalized practices and the employment 
of scientific methodology. Principally, STS demonstrates that 
scientific and technological practices are far more socially 
nuanced and complex than the public perception and 
presentation of these practices suggest. 
The relationship between technology and history is 
likewise complex: technological development and use have 
 58. See Webster, supra note 41, at 102-104. 
 59. WENDA K. BAUCHSPIES, JENNIFER CROISSANT & SAL RESTIVO, 
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 1 (2006).  
See also THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Wiebe E. 
Bijker et al. eds., 8th prtg. 2001). 
 60. By way of example, cellular phones were designed to enable wireless 
communications, but because technologies were needed to calculate the 
physical location of the cell phone to work, they are also now used as a 
government tracking devices to the extent that state agents can access 
telephone company records that track the geographic location of the phone’s 
usage.  See, e.g., In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with 
Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 754 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“While the 
cell phone was not originally conceived as a tracking device, law enforcement 
converts it to that purpose by monitoring cell site data.”). 
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many outcomes. Technology is not given to one specific future, 
despite Ellul’s dire warnings of a social world in which 
technique dominates.61 Nor is technology solely a slave to 
capitalist enterprises as Herbert Schiller or other political 
economists might suggest.62 As opposed to a relatively strict 
technological determinism, notions of a “soft determinism” 
remain tenable. Thus technologies may be seen as embedded in 
a particular “technological frame” which serves to guide 
(configure) future actions and relationships with those 
technologies, their users, and their subjects.63 Overall, STS 
demonstrates that there is an interrelation between historical 
social development and the development of technology.64 
Rather than suggesting that one drives the other (a 
reductionist critique of the perspectives of both 
instrumentalism and technological determinism), STS seeks a 
middle ground, seeing history and technological development 
 61. As for a theoretical framing of these issues, one theory articulated by 
a number of STS researchers is the Actor-Network Theory (ANT). In a manner 
similar to Castells, ANT posits that the work of “technoscience” (a term that 
indicates the interdependence of science and technology) is about the creation 
of larger and stronger networks.  For ANT, these networks are heterogenous, 
including “both human and non-human actors that have interests that need to 
be accommodated.” SERGIO SISMONDO, AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 65 (2004). The goal of these networks is to act together 
to achieve a particular and consistent effect in a machine-like fashion. The 
goal may likewise be to produce particular facts, in which the network is 
employed to ensure that the components are in agreement. Empirical research 
informed by ANT tends to focus both on the interests of the actors being 
examined (human, machine or artifact) and the socially inscribed process of 
“translating” these interests. In both scientific and technological endeavours, 
ANT highlights the very social nature of the work that is involved in the 
relationships that exist or are made to exist between objects and their 
representations.  See id. at 65-74. 
 62. See Schiller, supra note 42. 
 63. Technological frames are built up after periods of “interpretive 
flexibility,” in which a given technology can be seen as having numerous 
potential trajectories.  Id. at 81.  STS typically points out that in the end the 
social expectations and the design of a given technology begin to coalesce 
around a singular purpose and expectation. Id. The technological frame and 
the reduction in interpretive flexibility serve to both configure the way a 
particular technology is able to be used as well as configure the user of that 
technology by setting the parameters under which the technology may be 
socially expected to be used. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction 
of Facts and Artifacts: Or How The Sociology of Science and the Sociology of 
Technology Might Benefit Each Other, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 49, at 17. 
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as intertwined.65 
This discussion of sociological approaches to technology 
would be remiss if it neglected concerns of class, gender, and 
ethnicity. Some of the most prominent discussions pertaining to 
these concerns relate to the orientation of technological objects, 
often understood as masculine pursuits, and the existence of 
and potential for digital divides. As many authors recognize, 
the theoretical formulations that articulate a means for 
understanding the relations of technology with humanity 
should also embrace means for engaging with the social issues 
that these relations present.  For instance, feminist approaches 
to technology have long argued that technology is about men: 
technologies are largely controlled by men and are designed 
both by and for men. Cynthia Cockburn refers to this as a 
“technological segregation” which she views as particularly 
harmful.66 This perpetuates the economic and social 
disadvantages of women, bolstering job segregation by limiting 
employment of women in jobs which require technological 
expertise.  Other works focus on the growing digital divide: 
because technology is not neutral in its application, exclusions 
from design, exclusions from use, and exclusions from control 
often surround the adoption of new technologies.67  At their 
heart, these critiques of technology seek to understand how 
bias is integrated into technological systems and how this bias 
tends to perpetuate the advantage of some over and against the 
potentials for others. 
Theorizing about technology requires at its most basic level 
 65. Unlike STS, Giddens and other more postmodern approaches such as 
those of Mark Poster and Jean Bauldrillard, focus on and suggest that there 
has been a fundamental change in our social world. Both Giddens in his notion 
of “late modernity” and postmodernists see this social transformation as 
rendering more modern conceptions of the social world as obsolete. There are 
distinctions between “late modernity” and “post modernity” but overall they 
focus on the emergence of a society in which there has been a dissolution or 
fragmentation of modern frames of reference, i.e., institutions, identity, power, 
politics, etc.  See GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 148-150. 
 66. See CYNTHIA COCKBURN, MACHINERY OF DOMINANCE: WOMEN, MEN 
AND TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW 17-20 (1985).  Under one view, the critique of this 
segregation is reinforced by the persistent illusion of technology as freeing 
women, being an agent of social change. Images of 1950’s housewives whose 
machines simplify their daily tasks abound here, and yet as those same 
images suggest, this often reinforces “rather than undermine[s] gendered 
expectations.” EILEEN B. LEONARD, WOMEN, TECHNOLOGY AND THE MYTH OF 
PROGRESS 19 (2003). 
 67. See, e.g., PIPPA NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, 
INFORMATION POVERTY, AND THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE (2001). 
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an understanding of the implications of technology in the 
everyday life experiences of persons and social groups. 
Moreover, the issues raised by feminist approaches to 
technology as well as the concerns expressed above over the 
digital divide suggest that theoretical approaches 
considerations of technology must be grounded in empirical 
research. 
D. SUMMARY: TOWARD A SYNTHESIS 
We have discussed the theoretical frames of technology 
above in terms of their orientation to human agency and social 
structure. This is a very reductionist way of looking at 
perspectives on technology, as each of these theoretical frames 
is far more complex than this dichotomy suggests. However, 
simply put, one can see that instrumental perspectives on 
technology treat technology as merely a tool wielded by 
individuals and institutions. Technological transformation in 
this framework is a matter of purposeful action, a matter of 
rational and utilitarian choice. The perspective of the critical 
theorists and Jacques Ellul, however, suggest technology to be 
far more than a tool. In their estimation, technology is imbued 
with the power of the social structure, be it capitalism or Ellul’s 
technique, and as such has rendered the actions of human 
agents insignificant. 
This position is just as problematic as the instrumentalist 
vision, and, given the dichotomy postulated in this paper, 
Castells and STS, along with Andrew Feenberg’s revisions of 
critical theory, are shown as attempts to chart a middle ground. 
It is in these theoretical articulations that we find an explicit 
articulation of both human agency and the determining power 
inherent in social structures.  What is left largely unsaid is how 
these perspectives differ as to whether or not a substantial 
break has occurred in our understanding of the social world – 
whether the technologically inundated world in which we live is 
an intensified continuation of the modern world or distinct from 
it.  In the end, both perspectives on our understanding of 
whether technological eras should seen as continuous or 
discontinuous are found in literature representing both sides of 
this dichotomy.68 
 68. See, e.g., David Lyon, Surveillance Technology and Surveillance 
Society, in MODERNITY AND TECHNOLOGY 161, 161–63 (Thomas Misa, Philip 
Brey & Andrew Feenberg, eds., 2003) (claiming that modern and postmodern 
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We propose in a similar manner a law and technology 
theory that could balance the potentials for restrictive and 
beneficial forms of social structure against the limitations and 
potentials of human agency. Legal frameworks also need to 
simultaneously recognize the historic continuities in the 
development of technology as well as understand that the 
development of technology may have led to a world that is quite 
different than the past.69 
II. A SYNTHETIC LAW AND TECHNOLOGY THEORY 
A. LEGAL ANALYSIS AT THE INTERSECTION OF LAW AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
Unlike other academic disciplines, there has been no 
attempt to develop an overarching technology theory that could 
potentially inform legal scholarship and analysis.  Rather, legal 
analysts approach law and technology matters through the use 
of compartmentalized (but often related) subject areas: the 
traditional intellectual property topics (copyright, trademarks, 
and patents), biotechnology law, new media, 
telecommunications and so on.70  Perhaps the closest attempts 
to develop a law and technology theory relate to cyberlaw 
scholarship, although it typically only investigates 
technological change in the context of the Internet and other 
information technologies.71  As such, cyberlaw has been 
criticized for failing to provide insights that are helpful to 
illuminate the entire law.72  A better approach, we contend, 
would be to examine the ways that traditional doctrinal 
forms of surveillance exist simultaneously). 
 69. Legal scholars often implicitly stake out positions on the 
transformation/continuation spectrum.  For a treatment on the deficiencies of 
traditional legal regulation vis a vis the Internet because cyberspace is a “new 
space,” see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of 
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1400–02 (1996).  For a view that 
traditional international law mechanisms will properly address legal issues 
involving the Internet in part because historical technological developments 
have presented similar regulatory challenges, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Against 
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998). 
 70. See Cockfield, supra note 1 at 386–88. 
 71. For an attempt to generate general principles applicable to cyberlaw 
activities, see Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital 
Biosphere: How the Internet is Changing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REV. 333, 
348–59 (2002). 
 72. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207. 
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categories of the law—torts, criminal law, contracts, property 
and so on—interact with the specific technologies.73 
While the various components of technology law 
compartments may not follow a coherent or sensible format,74 
these compartmentalized approaches will not go away any time 
soon.  Doctrinal analysis evolves by building on existing law 
(and our understanding of existing law) by legislators (e.g., 
legislation) or judges (e.g., case law) and this analyis  must be 
an internally coherent so that lawyers will be able to provide 
effective and consistent legal advice to their clients.75  The 
‘always looking back’ element of stare decisis in the common 
law, for instance, promotes stability in the law while 
simultaneously ‘always looking forward’ to adapt to ever-
changing circumstances: “In order to know what it [the law] is, 
we must know what it has been, and what it tends to 
become.”76  For these reasons, we do not suggest that a law and 
technology theory should replace the traditional technology law 
avenues of enquiry into technology law, assuming such a move 
would be feasible.  Rather, the hope is that a law and 
technology theory could draw from these compartmentalized 
doctrinal boxes and reflect back on them with a broader 
perspective, so that legal analysis would be better informed by 
taking a fuller accounting of the interplay between technology 
and law.77 
 73. See id. at 208.  In response, Lawrence Lessig has argued that 
cyberlaw courses provide valuable insight into the limits of traditional law as 
a regulator of behavior.  See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999). 
 74. See BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760–1911, 3 (1999) 
(discussing the historical factors that shaped the traditional categories of 
intellectual property). 
 75. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, 
and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 925, 
926 (1996) (describing how the common law promotes reasoning by analogy to 
tie changing facts and circumstances to earlier judgments). 
 76. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) 
(Little, Brown and Co., ed. 1923). 
 77. By studying law and technology issues as matters that should be 
relegated to sealed boxes, legal scholarship has arguably promoted a body of 
doctrine that is unfinished and, at times, inadequately informed.  See, e.g., 
Dana R. Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, 
and the Regulatory Implications of Systems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 
1073, 1074–77 (2000) (noting that courts have struggled with limited success 
to apply legal precedents to disputes involving emerging technologies and “[i]n 
many cases, those law-and technology issues that have been addressed have 
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While broader theories of technology have not yet been 
developed, legal analysts at least implicitly stake out positions 
along the theoretical spectrum discussed in the previous Part.  
Consistent with Feenberg’s views on the social sciences and 
public policy researchers, instrumental theory seems to 
dominate much law and technology analysis. Legal analysis 
often fails to take into explicit account the ways that 
technological developments may undermine or augment 
individual or broader social interests.  There have nevertheless 
been some efforts to take a broader perspective towards the 
potential uses of technology to protect legal interests.  As 
mentioned, cyberlaw research has explored some of the 
technolocially-imposed limits of law as a potential regulator. 
Technological structures themselves now play roles formerly 
played by law: the dicta that ‘code is law’ represents such an 
explicit attempt to see how a certain form of technology—the 
software and hardware technologies that enable the Internet—
can constrain or enable certain forms of individual behavior. 
Hence the code can potentially be directed by regulators in such 
a way to arrive at more optimal forms of policy.78  More explicit 
evaluation of the interplay between technology and law is also 
seen in other areas, such as the ongoing debate surrounding 
whether legislatures or courts are better suited to deal with 
legal issues involving complex technological developments.79 
It has also been noted that a more coherent law and 
technology approach is needed to address ‘recurring dilemmas’ 
been resolved only partially or inconclusively.”). 
 78. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 
(1999); M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First Amendment: Virtual 
Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 341 (asserting that 
regulating technological developments of the Internet can be used to promote 
public interests); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of 
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 560–68 
(1998) (discussing policies to regulate information flows). 
 79. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 47 
(1982) (arguing that administrative agencies have an inherent bias against 
adapting legislation to technology change).  For an argument that, when 
technology is changing rapidly, courts should generally defer to legislators in 
part because legislators can enact clearer rules and solicit expert input, see 
Orin S. Kerr, Congress, the Courts, and New Technologies: A Response to 
Professor Solove, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 779, 782–83 (2005).  See also David 
Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 
85 (2001-2002); John D. Gregory, Solving Legal Issues in Electronic 
Government: Jurisdiction, Regulation, Governance, 3 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 1, 18 
(2003) (discussing how governments need to carefully scrutinize technological 
developments to ensure that legislation affects the targeted areas to reduce 
the risk of spillover effects). 
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where traditional approaches have been  inadequate, such as 
(1) the potential need for laws to ban, inhibit or encourage new 
technology; (2) reducing uncertainty in the application of 
existing legal rules as applied to new practices; (3) avoiding the 
possible over-inclusiveness or under-inclusiveness of existing 
legal rules as applied to new practices; and (4) remedying 
obsolescence of existing rules.80  Under another view, the study 
of diffusion attributes would aid in determining the appropriate 
structure and timing of legal responses aimed at the optimal 
promotion of new technologies.81 
B. RECONCILING THE TWO PERSPECTIVES INTO A SYNTHETIC 
THEORY 
These efforts do not have an underlying legal theory that 
ties them together.  So where to go from here?  The previous 
Part identified a number of deficiencies associated with the 
instrumental and substantive perspectives, bearing on their 
potential utility for use in legal analysis.  Instrumental theory 
tends to underappreciate the complex interaction between law, 
technology and human institutions that can lead to 
unanticipated and adverse social policy outcomes.  The 
substantive theories seem to pay insufficient heed to the 
importance of human agency. They are too quick to assume 
that technological structures overwhelm the wills of technology 
producers and consumers. 
The tone of substantive and critical theories of technology 
perhaps most closely resembles the critical legal theory 
scholarship of the 1970s and early 1980s. This is particularly 
apparent in their hostility to market forces, which these 
theories see as mainly preserving and promoting the power of 
 80. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to 
Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. 
& TECH. 505, 517 (2005).  See also Kieran Tranter, ‘The History of the Haste 
Wagons’: Motor Car 1909 (VIC), Emergent Technology and the Call for Law, 29 
MELB. U. L. REV. 843, 875–879 (2005) (attempting to identify common links 
among legal responses to innovations). 
 81. See Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic 
Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241 (2006) (discussing 
the relationship between privacy and a technology’s diffusion process in the 
context of genetic discrimination and internet privacy).  See also Gaia 
Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing 
and the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REV. 963, 965 (2004) (proposing a “socially 
oriented approach that focuses on the impact of technological innovation on 
social structures, institutions, and values”). 
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social elites.  Both strains of thought are often informed by 
Marxist or post-Marxist philosophies.82  The substantive and 
critical theories of technology also resemble earlier critical legal 
theories such as those that challenged a slavish adherence to 
laissez faire economics.83  These earlier legal theories, however, 
differ from substantive and critical theories of technology in 
their acceptance of market forces generally and in their 
recognition that those forces normally bestow beneficial 
outcomes on society. Their approach merely called for careful 
scrutiny to see that market forces are not abused.84 
The many problems surrounding the substantive theories 
disqualify them from serving as the sole theoretical structural 
base for a law and technology theory.85  Rather, a synthesis of 
the instrumental/substantive views may offer help to legal 
analysts struggling with vexing legal challenges in an era of 
seemingly unlimited technological change. 
Unlike the substantive theories or critical theories of 
technology, which find their philosophical roots in Marxism or 
post-Marxism, the synthetic theory is more closely aligned with 
liberal political philosophy or its more recent incarnations such 
as progressive liberalism or neo-liberalism, philosophies that 
are more compatible with much contemporary legal 
scholarship.86  Classical liberalism is “generally viewed as a 
relatively coherent set of principles centering on the defense of 
individual rights and liberties, the security of property, and the 
notion of limited government.”87  Liberalism recognizes man’s 
essentially selfish characteristics, but tries to promote the 
adoption of institutions that employ self-interested behavior to 
promote socially beneficial objectives, including, for example, 
pro-capitalist mechanisms for promoting wealth-creation that 
would fund public services. It would also encourage wealth 
 82. See James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: A Critical Legal Theory and 
Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 721–25 (1985); A. Michael 
Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 763 (2003). 
 83. See BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: 
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 2 (1998). 
 84. Id. 
 85. But see Trosow, supra note 4, at 456–62 (claiming that Marx-informed 
social theory is the better tool for legal analysis dealing with information age 
issues). 
 86. Albeit often in an unexamined form. 
 87. KRISTIE M. MCCLURE, JUDGING RIGHTS: LOCKEAN POLITICS AND THE 
LIMITS OF CONSENT 3 (1996). 
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redistribution via progressive taxes.88 
The liberal project is, however, never complete and much 
legal scholarship emphasizes the need for new approaches to 
enhance the ideal of the meritocracy and promote solutions for 
even greater egalitarianism.  Under classical liberalism, 
property rights serve as a foundation—a necessary 
prerequisite—for individual freedom (to a certain extent the 
reverse of the Marxist conception).89  Above all, liberalism 
respects the rights of individuals to determine, and be 
responsible for, their own destiny. More contemporary visions 
of liberalism strive to develop institutions to promote this goal, 
while recognizing that there are serious impediments to its 
attainment, including family wealth disparities and systemic 
barriers such as racism.90  As such, liberalism is loosely related 
to the proposed synthetic theory that strives to respect human 
agency via the instrumental perspective, while recognizing a 
need for the law to address the deeper and often less apparent 
ways that technological developments may be thwarting or 
inhibiting the attainment of just policy outcomes. 
Finally, the proposed synthetic theory is consistent with 
some of the more recent works (e.g., the writings of Feenberg, 
Castells and STS) which recognize the complex interplay 
between society and technology. These works seek to find new 
matrices or forms of analysis to evaluate this interplay, in the 
interest of developing tools for inducing socially optimal 
technological developments. 
C. USING SYNTHETIC THEORY TO INFORM LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In a previous work, it was suggested that, in situations 
involving technological change, legislators and courts employ 
two implicit approaches when examining the relationship 
between law and technology.91 On the one hand, some legal 
 88. For discussion, see generally Arthur Cockfield, Income Taxes and 
Individual Liberty: A Lockean Perspective on Radical Consumption Tax 
Reform, 46 S.D. L. Rev. 8 (2001). 
 89. See Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the 
Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (2005). 
 90. Cockfield, supra note 78, at 61-65. 
 91. We also recognized that there will often be a significant blur between 
these two broad analytical approaches. See generally Cockfield, supra note 1, 
at 388–99 (discussing the difference between the “liberal” and “conservative” 
approaches).  To a certain extent, the different approaches reflect the differing 
approaches to the interpretation of statutory and common law rules where 
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analysts use a flexible and forward-looking or “liberal” 
approach (not to be confused with the political philosophy of 
liberalism touched on earlier) that considers how the law can 
best protect interests and values when they are threatened by 
technological developments.92 Moreover, these analysts 
recognize that technological developments are embedded within 
economic, political, social, and other processes. This view is 
more closely related to the substantive theories of technology 
that scrutinize technological change within its broader 
economic/political/social context. 
On the other hand, legal analysis can also be more rigid or 
“conservative” in the sense that it emphasizes the need to 
follow traditional doctrine without fully taking into account 
how the interplay between law and technological developments 
can undermine interests and values.93 At times, this 
conservative approach is employed to try to promote legal 
consistency and certainty, always important objectives as they 
enable individuals who are potentially affected by the law to 
plan their activities to conform with perceived legal 
expectations.  In this respect, the conservative approach may 
often be more closely aligned with the instrumentalists who 
view technological developments as separated from economic, 
political, cultural and social processes. 
We have previously described how the law evolves by 
integrating these different perspectives.  In times of technology 
change – when values and interests are in flux – the law will 
integrate the liberal approach and the more rigid or 
conservative approach in different ways.94  We claim that the 
liberal orientation involving more creative approaches towards 
preserving traditional legal interests threatened by 
technological change will result in more internal stability 
‘conservative’ judges apply rules without taking into full account the rule’s 
underlying purpose whereas a more ‘liberal’ or flexible judge would seek to 
promote the rule’s intended outcome.  See generally CALABRESI, supra note 68, 
at 163–66. 
 92. See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, Jurisdiction to Tax: A Law and 
Technology Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 85 (2003) (describing legal/policy 
responses to assist tax enforcement over remote sales encouraged by new 
technologies); Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet into a Taxable 
Forum: A Case Study in E-Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1171 (2001) 
(discussing the ways that policy-makers confront situations where 
technological change challenges traditional tax policy principles). 
 93. For discussion, see Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological 
Change and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress 
and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976, 1012–15 (1997). 
 94. See Cockfield, supra note 1, at 410-13. 
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within the law, at least in the long run.  The interests at stake 
throughout this process are traditional in the sense that the 
judges or policy-makers should strive to identify the most 
critical interests that the law currently protects.  Admittedly, 
there is much room for debate concerning what constitutes a 
critical interest, determining an ultimate policy prescription.  
Because technologies themselves affect, change, and mask 
interests, the preservation of traditional interests will have a 
stabilizing effect on society. 
The liberal approach transforms the law because judges 
and legal practitioners may subsequently deploy the new forms 
of legal analysis in areas of the law that have been relatively 
unaffected by technology change.  For example, an expanded 
notion of consideration with respect to shrink-wrapped 
software (where consumers are not provided with all of the 
elements of the license contract until they access the CD within 
the shrink-wrapped box) may be deployed in other areas of 
contract law that do not examine situations involving new 
technologies.95 
To the extent that the conservative approach fails to 
properly protect legal interests threatened by technological 
change, a more severe correction will later take place to restore 
the law to its initial equilibrium.  For example, U.S. 
constitutional protections against unreasonable state searches 
were initially interpreted not to cover police wiretaps of home 
telephones.  This led to significant legal uncertainty until a 
correction took place forty years later when the U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed its earlier view.96  This correction may form 
part of the ability of the common law to “work itself pure” by 
revising earlier precedents that have been found to lead to 
unjust outcomes.97 
This transformation of the law via the liberal approach, 
however, is not without drawbacks.  For example, the liberal 
approach can weaken or undermine the common law principle 
of stare decisis, because old decisions may be less helpful as 
precedents for present or future cases. This in turn makes it 
 95. See, e.g., ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(rejecting traditional contract law analysis to uphold a license agreement 
involving shrink-wrapped software). 
 96. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (this issue is developed in more depth infra Part 
II.C). 
 97. See Omichund v. Barker, (1744) 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (K.B). 
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more difficult for lawyers to predict the outcome of a case when 
they advise clients.  As such, the liberal approach should be 
deployed only to the extent it can be demonstrated that 
technology change has or will likely destabilize traditional legal 
interests.  Because of these problems, one goal of law and 
technology theory could be to assist in determining when 
interests are sufficiently threatened with destabilization to 
justify the invocation of the more liberal approach. 
A synthesis of the two perspectives would inform the 
previous claims about the nature of law. Under this synthesis, 
when technological change undermines traditional interests 
that the law seeks to protect, legal analysis would become more 
contextual and forward-looking, and less deferential to 
traditional doctrine and precedents.  This perspective does not 
seek to present a radical reconception of traditional legal 
analysis involving law and technology matters.98  Rather, the 
theory simply requires a more explicit consideration of the 
interplay between law and technology and the ways technology 
can have a substantive impact on individuals and their legal 
interests apart from the technology’s initial intended use.  In 
other words, legal analysis informed by substantive theories 
can promote more just outcomes by taking a more critical 
examination of the ways that technological developments may 
be subverting legal interests that that law has traditionally 
sought to protect. 
This framework can be broken down into the following 
parts and subparts: 
Part 1 
Determine whether the technological change is 
undermining traditional interests by: 
A. Identifying the traditional interest protected by law 
(e.g., business certainty, protection of innovator’s 
rights) by resorting to traditional doctrinal analysis 
applicable to the affected area of technology law; and 
B. Assessing whether the interest is being unduly 
disrupted by technology change. 
This initial step is more closely aligned with the 
                                                          
 98. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First 
Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1003, 1004-05 (2000) (describing how doctrinal analysis often requires 
the reconciliation of traditional legal principle in light of technological 
innovation); Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1885 (2001) (discussing how law responds to situations involving 
technology change). 
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instrumental approach.  It calls for caution in using non-
traditional legal analysis that might interfere with the 
development or adoption of certain technologies.99  This 
approach does a better job at respecting human agency when 
compared to substantive or critical theories of technology.  
Instrumentalism sees consumers not as passive sheep, but as 
active determinants in the adoption, persistence, or 
obsolescence of technologies.  It assumes that the role of law is 
to provide a legal framework, including a private property 
regime, that promotes technological development by rewarding 
innovation, which it is thought indirectly promotes the common 
good.100  This view is also consistent with the research 
perspectives of Castells and STS that seek to understand the 
non-linear interplay among technology, individuals, and their 
societies without assuming this relationship to suggest that 
structure has overcome agency.101  Most importantly from a 
legal analyst’s perspective, this initial step of the synthetic 
approach encourages careful analysis of the unique facts and 
circumstances of each legal issue in the interest of promoting a 
“just” result. 
Part 2 
If the first part of the analysis determines that technology 
change is disrupting traditional interests, the next step is to 
use more contextual analysis that: 
A.  Scrutinizes the broader context of technology change 
and its potentially unanticipated adverse outcomes for 
the traditional interest as well as for other protected 
interests the law seeks to protect; and 
B.  Seeks to find legal solutions to protect the traditional 
interest that are less deferential to precedent and 
traditional doctrine. 
In this step, legal analysis can be better assisted by 
                                                          
 99. To a certain extent, this part of the framework could be compared to 
the doctrinal method of constitutional interpretation.  The second part more 
closely resembles the contextual balancing act of different interests under 
prudential interpretation, although it is recognized there are other potential 
interpretive approaches.  For discussion on different interpretative techniques 
and forms of legal reasoning, see, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991). 
 100. Substantive and critical theories of technology often reject this view. 
 101. This contrasts the warnings of other substantive theorists who make 
normative assumptions that modern technologies are often harmful to 
individuals and their communities. 
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substantive theories of technology, which emphasize the 
preservation of  traditional interests in an attempt to combat 
technological structure that overwhelms and subverts these 
interests.  For instance, according to the views propounded by 
the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, Weber and Ellul, our 
seemingly technology-swamped modern world forms part of a 
larger (and less apparent) process moving toward the 
rationalization and bureaucratization of all human institutions. 
Accordingly, we measure legal rules against their potential 
impact on cold and rational outcomes such as efficiency – while 
neglecting just policy outcomes. 
Finally, it is important to note there may be significant 
overlap in terms of the theoretical strands that could inform 
the two main parts of the analysis.  For instance, the first part 
may require contextual analysis to determine what interest is 
being affected by the technology change.  The challenge for the 
legal analyst will be to bring these two strands together into a 
synthetic theory, while simultaneously holding them apart.  As 
previously mentioned, the tension identified by Ellul matches 
the tension that occurs when legal analysts confront 
technological change.  On the one hand, the law often prefers to 
look “backward” to promote certainty and consistency, yet at 
times must simultaneously move “forward” by taking into 
account the effects of new technologies so that, in a seeming 
paradox, traditional interests will be protected.102  The 
proposed synthetic theory of law and technology is reflective of 
Ellul’s views in that it necessitates simultaneously bringing 
together the two theoretical strands—instrumental and 
substantive theories—while, in a way, also keeping them apart.  
It also reflects the work of Feenberg and recent research efforts 
by sociologists and others in areas such as STS. 
D. CASE STUDY: STATE SEARCHES AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
The following example concerning the use of new 
technologies to conduct state investigative searches shows how 
the proposed synthetic theory of law and technology could help 
to inform legal analysis.103  Elaborate analysis of the use state 
 102. See the discussion in Part I.B. 
 103. The analysis in this section draws from Arthur J. Cockfield, Who 
Watches the Watchers? A Law and Technology Perspective on Growing 
Government and Private Sector Surveillance, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 364 (2003) and 
Arthur J. Cockfield, Protecting the Social Value of Privacy in the Context of 
State Investigations Using New Technologies, 40 U.B.C. L. REV (forthcoming 
2007). 
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searches and new technologies has been conducted elsewhere.  
This example is only meant to highlight a few of the relevant 
issues.104 
1. Background: Warrantless Wiretap Searches 
In 1928, the Supreme Court was confronted with its first 
wiretap case.105  The accused, Olmstead, had been convicted of 
the illegal sale, distribution, and import of alcohol from 
Canada.  The conviction arose largely as a result of a wiretap at 
his business premises.  The issue before the court was whether 
a warrantless wiretap search by the police violated the Fourth 
Amendment as a constitutionally impermissible state search.  
Looking back to precedents, the majority of the Court held that 
the police did not need to get a warrant for the wiretap because 
it did not involve a physical search of the household: “The 
[Fourth Amendment] does not forbid what was done here. 
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence 
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. 
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the 
defendants.”106   
Brandeis, in his well-known dissent, took another 
approach.  He identified the interest at stake, as well as the 
impact the new technologies would have on this interest: “The 
makers of our Constitution  . . . conferred, as against the 
government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive 
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.  To protect 
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government 
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.”107  Brandeis recognized that, while wiretapping 
was designed to protect against crime, the over-extension of the 
new technology could lead to an environment that is less 
secure: 
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have 
become available to the government. 
Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by 
 104. For a recent work that summarizes different scholarly perspectives, 
see KIRSTIE BALL ET AL., A REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY FOR THE 
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER BY THE SURVEILLANCE STUDIES NETWORK 38-48 
(2006) (discussing, inter alia, the social consequences of surveillance). 
 105. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 106. Id. at 464. 
 107. Id. at 478. 
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means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain 
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.  Moreover, “in 
the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of 
what has been, but of what may be.” The progress of science in 
furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to 
stop with wire tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which 
the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can 
reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to 
a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the 
psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring 
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. 
. . . . 
. . . As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants 
are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared 
with wire tapping.108 
Brandeis implicitly followed the analytical framework 
discussed above.  He accepts that law enforcement officials 
have legitimate public security interests in developing and 
deploying new technologies to protect the public.  But once he 
determined that important interests such as the right to 
privacy were being subverted, he was ready to explore, in a 
manner more consistent with the substantive theories 
discussed above, how the new technologies would in fact make 
the public less secure in the long run.  “Experience should teach 
us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the 
government’s purposes are beneficent . . . . The greatest 
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”109  Almost 
forty years later, the majority of the Court adopted Brandeis’ 
views.110 
Digitization and  Modern Surveillance Technologies 
Brandeis’s approach in Olmstead remains particularly 
relevant today in an era when surveillance technologies have 
become increasingly sophisticated, with the corresponding 
potential to invade privacy interests.  New software programs 
allow police or intelligence officers to sift through electronic 
information, including Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) traffic 
data, emails, and website visits.  They can remotely install 
software on the hard drive of a suspect’s computer; once 
 108. Id. at 473-76. 
 109. Id. at 479. 
 110. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).  Based in part on 
the reasoning in this case, the U.S. Supreme Court more recently held that 
police use of thermal imaging to scan for the use of high intensity grow lamps 
inside private residences constitutes an impermissible search. Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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installed, the program logs all keystrokes on the computer.  
Wireless communication devices such as cell phones also 
provide records of the physical location of the devices (along 
with the location of the devices’ users), which can be accessed 
by the state. 
In addition to government efforts, the private sector has 
embraced technological developments that enhance the ability 
of businesses to collect detailed information on customers or 
employees.  Businesses have always tracked their customers’ 
behavior (e.g., through credit card purchases) and sold this 
information to third parties.  So, it is not so much a question of 
novelty, but more a question of scale and context. Information 
technology developments now permit an enormous quantity of 
detailed transactional information to be gathered and stored, 
and for relationships to be drawn between formerly discrete 
identities. 
At some point, the surveillance technologies could become 
integrated with large private sector and government 
databases.111 Many newly proposed government initiatives 
would link government databases with industry databases, and 
could create powerful tools for a surveillance society. The 
merged databases could contain detailed personal information 
about individuals, including their email records, health 
problems, credit history and credit card purchases, criminal 
records and interactions with the police, employment histories, 
telephone records, television shows watched, vacation 
destinations, and website visits. Under the guise of national 
security, these merged databases could be scrutinized by a 
government employee without the knowledge of the individual 
in question.  The potential threat to traditional privacy 
interests is clear. 
The global push towards efficiency and security within 
surveillance networks can be critiqued through the works of 
substantive theorists like Ellul.  Ellul warned of the potentially 
dehumanizing effects of the trend towards bureaucratization 
and rationalization in the modern age.  In Ellul’s view, in a 
world that succumbs to such “technique,” things such as 
emotions, aesthetics, and passions are given little significance. 
In the technological society, we require that our welfare, 
 111. See, e.g., INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, WHAT PRICE 
PRIVACY? THE UNLAWFUL TRADE IN CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL INFORMATION 
7-10 (2006). 
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defense, tax, immigration, and health systems be efficient; the 
operational goals of these systems must never be skewed by 
emotions or biased viewpoints. 
As Ellul says, “no demands can be made that run contrary 
to technological growth.”112  Ellul in particular may not have 
been surprised by the use of new surveillance technologies to 
respond to the threat of terrorism.  He suggested that, in the 
modern age, we believe that technologies will solve all the 
dilemmas we face in life. We turn to a new technological 
solution and perpetuate an increasingly complicated 
technological cycle, looking at means rather than ends, seeking 
to solve problems without questioning the nature of those 
problems. In this process, human beings become part of the 
machine, themselves components of (and resources for) the 
technological society.113  Accordingly, Ellul might well suggest 
that the deployment of enhanced surveillance technologies and 
networks should be carefully monitored to avoid subverting 
traditional interests such as freedom of expression. 
Ellul describes himself as a hopeful pessimist, calling on 
people to exploit the cracks in the technological system. He 
urges people to hold on to the possibility of human freedom 
over and against a technological society that increasingly 
attempts to mold human beings into its own image.  Hence, he 
might hope that a government’s increasing use of surveillance 
networks could be reversed at some point. 
2. New Anti-Terrorism Laws and Traditional Legal Protections 
Against State Searches 
Yet instead of a legal backlash against increased 
government surveillance, we have seen that the enhanced use 
of surveillance networks by governments and private actors has 
been accompanied by legal changes that reduce or remove 
traditional safeguards against state searches.  As a result of 
terrorist attacks on the United States on  September 11, 2001, 
as well as subsequent attacks in other countries, the United 
States and other governments have modified their laws to 
facilitate surveillance of their citizens, residents, and foreign 
individuals. These legal changes include: making it easier to 
obtain warrants to use electronic surveillance against terrorist 
suspects; abolishing the need to obtain warrants in cases of 
perceived threats to national security; reducing legal 
 112. See ELLUL, supra note 47, at 135. 
 113. Id. at 137. 
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thresholds to obtain electronic records; enhancing the 
government’s ability to share personal information among 
different government agencies, foreign governments, and the 
private sector; and increasing the government’s abilities to 
deport residents for violations of immigration laws.114 
While the anti-terrorism laws were subject to explicit 
(albeit limited) evaluation prior to implementation, less 
attention has been paid to their interplay with technological 
developments that surround these policy changes. The problem 
is that such inattention to technological developments leads to 
an increased risk that unanticipated adverse social outcomes 
will take place— that the technology will trap us within 
Weber’s “iron cage.” 
3. Exploring the Social Value of Privacy 
Intrusive surveillance practices are normally rationalized 
under the view that reduced privacy is necessary to promote 
public security.  But, like Brandeis, we should be wary of this 
view.  In fact, the traditional privacy/security dialectic in public 
policy circles is increasing viewed as unhelpful.  By drawing 
from substantive perspectives of technology, we can derive a 
more accurate assessment of the risks associated with 
reduction of legal protections in an era of enhanced surveillance 
technologies.  Under the substantive view, legal analysis 
should recognize the “public” or “social” aspect of privacy, which 
is society’s interest in preserving privacy apart from the 
interest of a particular individual’s interest.115  Priscilla Regan, 
for instance, argues that privacy serves purposes beyond those 
that it performs for a particular individual.  She notes that one 
aspect of the social value of privacy is that it sets boundaries 
for the state’s exercise of power. Such boundaries, for example, 
 114. For a discussion of the legality of the National Security Agency’s 
warrantless wiretapping of international communications program, see ACLU 
v. National Security Agency, No. 06-CV-10204, slip op. at 28-33 (D. Mich. Aug. 
17, 2006) (holding that the program is constitutionally impermissible, as it 
violates rights to privacy and free speech).  In Canada, a similar program was 
authorized by Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, which gave new 
warrantless surveillance powers to an intelligence agency called the 
Communications Security Establishment.  The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, 
R.S.C., ch. 36 (2001). 
 115. Earlier views on privacy tended to emphasize individualized aspects of 
privacy, such as individual control over personal information accessible by 
third parties.  See generally ALLAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 
(1967). 
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underlie freedom of speech and association within a democratic 
political system.116  Under this view, even if privacy becomes 
less important to certain individuals, it continues to serve other 
critical interests in a free and democratic state (e.g., the need to 
protect political dissent) beyond those that it performs for a 
particular person.  As such, the preservation of the social value 
of privacy is consistent with the promotion of long-term 
security interests. 
Consistent with this view, research by sociologists, political 
scientists, and others explores how technological advances in 
surveillance heighten the risk of unanticipated adverse social 
consequences.117 These outcomes include repression of political 
dissent as surveillance technologies are used to target 
identifiable groups such as Muslims, without evidence of 
individual wrongdoing.  This sort of profiling tends to lead to 
social alienation of the targeted group, which increasingly leads 
to an “us versus them” mentality. Further, pervasive and 
unseen scrutiny by state agents carries the potential for 
inhibiting freedom of expression as individuals fear their 
speech and actions could be monitored by the police. 
Moreover, political complacency may set in to the extent 
that ubiquitous surveillance reduces or eliminates any 
subjective expectation of privacy and as citizens refuse to 
question more and more state scrutiny. Finally, nations become 
less democratic when citizens have greater difficulty in holding 
state agents accountable for their actions—technological and 
legal developments increase the risk that police and 
intelligence officers will abuse their new surveillance powers 
without being detected. The failure of some legal analysis to 
consider fully the interplay between law and technology in the 
 116. Regan divides privacy into three social values: (1) a common value 
where all persons have a common interest in a right to privacy although they 
may differ on views on the specific content of privacy; (2) a public value where 
privacy is instrumentally valuable to a democratic political system; and (3) a 
collective value where privacy is seen as a collective good that, from an 
economist’s perspective, cannot be efficiently provided by the marketplace.  
See PRISCILLA REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 221-230 (1995).  See also COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. 
RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES (2003); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: 
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989). 
 117. See, e.g., David Lyon & Elia Zureik, Surveillance, Privacy, and the 
New Technology, in COMPUTERS, SURVEILLANCE, AND PRIVACY 1, 1-17 (David 
Lyon & Elia Zureik eds., 1996); JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL 
REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY (1986). 
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A synthesis incorporating the better elements of the two 
theories could help to define the ambit and scope of a 
comprehensive theory of law and technology theory.  The 
instrumentalist approach reminds legal analysts that each 
context of state surveillance and privacy raises the risk that 
important democratic interests will be undermined.  In the long 
run, this failure could make our societies less secure.  
Incorporating perspectives from substantive theories of 
technology, our proposed synthetic approach will better clarify 
the interests at stake so that legal rules can be designed and 
interpreted to ensure that these social privacy interests remain 
adequately protected. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal scholars have not yet developed a broad theory of 
technology, perhaps because of a felt need to examine legal 
issues under particular sets of facts and circumstances.  The 
traditional compartmentalized approach that scrutinizes niche 
doctrinal areas of technology law (e.g., patent law or copyright 
law) or the impact of specific technologies (e.g., cyberlaw, new 
media, or biotechnology) may be inhibiting a fuller exploration 
of the nuanced interplay between law and technology and may 
be reducing the chances of attaining sound policy outcomes.  A 
general theory of law and technology could teach us how to 
address situations where legal interests appear to be 
threatened by technological change, while still respecting the 
need for individualized assessment of specific legal matters. 
In contrast to legal scholarship, there are ongoing efforts 
within other academic disciplines to explore general theories of 
technology.  For instance, writings by sociologists tend to 
emphasize the potentials of human agency in light of 
technological structures that may (as some accounts suggest) 
overcome the potential for human autonomy or freedom. 
Sociological research also focuses on whether current 
conceptions of technology can be understood as maintaining a 
historical continuity or exists as something definitively 
discontinuous with previous experiences of new technologies.  
Instrumental theories largely fail to explicitly consider the role 
of technology in determining or subverting individual and 
social affairs in unanticipated ways.  Substantive theories, on 
the other hand, downplay the role of human agency in 
technological developments and are informed by somewhat 
dated Marxist or post-Marxist perspectives. 
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legal solution must be carefully scrutinized under its own facts 
and circumstances to determine whether technology is unduly 
subverting interests that the law has traditionally protected.  
Once a determination is made that technology is in fact 
harming traditional interests, the substantive approach can 
inform analysis that seeks a broader contextual (i.e., less 
deferential to precedent) understanding of potential legal 
solutions that will preserve the traditional interests. 
The proposed synthetic approach should be seen as 
consistent with most existing law and technology analysis. We 
hope to make this analysis more explicit in its consideration of 
the ways that the dynamics of technological change can lead to 
unanticipated and adverse policy outcomes. Indeed, a closer 
scrutiny of these dynamics may also help to illuminate the 
entire legal corpus, possibly even shedding light on ways that 
technological change transforms the law itself. 
